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1.  Introduction 
 
Regulators of network utilities, such as fixed telephony, electricity,  and gas typically 
impose on monopolists (or the main operator) a universal service obligation (USO), which 
aims to guarantee the equal access of all consumers to the service at a reasonable cost. The 
universal service goal is typically based on equity and/or efficiency grounds (for those 
services that exhibit positive externalities) and it has been a central element of many 
industrial and regulatory policies. 
 
These USOs are still quite common in developing and underdeveloped countries, where 
access to certain services --as in the case of fixed telephony-- is far from being universal.
1 
In these countries, the universal access problem typically has two different dimensions: one 
of these is the rural dimension, which is mainly associated to underdeveloped networks and 
its larger costs in less populated areas;
2 and the other one is related to the (un)willingness of 
low income consumers to pay for services in areas where networks are available.
3 
 
In this paper, the focus is on this second dimension, and by imposing a universal access 
constraint on the regulator's problem, the optimal two-part tariffs he should set is derived 
under three different regulatory schemes:
4 one in which the monopolist is forced to offer a 
single regulated two-part tariff, and the other two in which he is able to offer alternative 
tariff schemes but must always offer the regulated tariff. The latter two schemes differ in 
the degree of flexibility permitted to the monopolist to price discriminate among 
consumers: in the first scheme, all tariffs -including the one set by the regulator- must be 
readily available for all customers, and in the second only the regulated tariff needs to be 
offered to all consumers, so the monopolist can tailor alternative tariff schemes for each 
consumer group. 
 
Regulatory schemes where the main operator is granted flexibility to design alternative 
plans are seen more frequently in Latin America in the last few years. In 2004, the Chilean 
authority (SubTel) granted the regulated operator (Telefonica CTC) the flexibility to offer 
different tariff schemes in addition to the regulated one. A similar regulatory framework is 
using the Colombian authority (CRT) since 2005: the regulator defines the Basic Plan's 
maximum tariff, which must be offered with the firm's alternative plans. Several other Latin 
                                                 
1 Although the results are general for most network utilities, the paper will refer mainly to the fixed telephony 
case. 
2 In Latin America, there have been two main approaches to foster telecom network development in rural 
areas. Some countries like Mexico, Brasil and Venezuela imposed network expansion obligations when they 
privatized their national monopolies, while other countries like Chile and Peru relied on reverse auctions for 
minimum subsidies to provide connectivity in remote areas (García-Murillo and Kuerbis, 2005). 
3 The number of main fixed lines per one hundred urban inhabitants in Latin America ranges from 3.7 in 
Paraguay and 4.4 in Bolivia to 21.7 in Argentina and 26.6 in Uruguay; while in developed nations with 
percentage levels of urban population similar to those of Uruguay and Argentina (above 85%) such as the UK 
or Germany the same figure is near 50 (source, ITU statistics at http://www.itu.int on Main Telephone Lines 
in 2007, and The United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision at http://data.un.org on 
percentage of urban population). 
4 The two-part tariff refers to a monthly fixed charge and a per-unit price. In most Latin American countries, 
unlike for example the U.S., the per-minute price for local calls is not zero. American countries (Brazil, Mexico, and Peru) allow their main fixed telephony operators 
to offer alternative plans beyond the regulated ones as well. The regulatory schemes, 
however, differ in several aspects: In Peru and Mexico a cap is set on a basket of plans; 
while in Brazil the regulator defines two plans that all operators must offer. 
 
Two questions arising from the different schemes are: firstly, how much flexibility should 
the monopolist have to design tariff schemes different from the one designed by the 
regulator? And secondly, which is the regulator's optimal tariff plan for the different 
regulatory schemes? 
 
This paper shows that the regulatory scheme which gives the most flexibility to the 
monopolist Pareto dominates the one in which all tariffs must be available to all customers 
for some parameter configurations (and is equally good for all other parameters), with this 
one strictly dominating the more rigid and traditional one in which the monopolist can only 
offer the regulated tariff. It is characterized when the regulatory schemes of partial and full 
flexibility are both efficient and in which cases this is only true for the latter one; and also 
how the optimally regulated tariff changes as the regulatory regime switches from the most 
rigid one to more flexible ones. The predicted changes are consistent with the changes 
observed in Chile and Colombia when more flexible regulatory regimes were introduced. 
 
The results are derived in a simple setup in which the unique information asymmetry 
between the regulator and the monopolist is about the type of each consumer, which is 
assumed to be known to the firm but not to the regulator.
5 These results depend on the 
assumption that universal access is an issue. This is operationalized by assuming that there 
is no two-part tariff such that the monopolist breaks even and that the low valuation 
consumers are willing to subscribe to the network (if this were the case, a single two-part 
tariff would be first-best efficient).
6 
 
The case of partial flexibility, although weakly dominated, is relevant for reasons of 
political economy, because it could be hard for the regulator to explain why certain plans 
are available to some customers but not to others. It is precisely in the situation when a 
certain group would prefer the tariff scheme of a different one that the fully flexible 
regulatory scheme strictly dominates the one of partial flexibility. 
 
The findings are in line with the literature on price delegation (Loeb and Magat, 1979; 
Armstrong and Vickers, 1991; Riordan, 1984; Sappington and Sibley, 1988; Sharkey and 
Sibley, 1993; Sibley, 1989; Bertoletti and Polleti, 1997; and Vogelsang, 1989 and 1990) in 
the sense that granting the informed party the possibility to set the prices constrained in 
some particular way is desirable. 
 
                                                 
5 The extension to the case where neither the regulator nor the firm know each consumer type is 
straightforward: the case of full flexibility is identical to the case of partial flexibility, because the incentive 
compatibility constraints the monopolist should consider when designing the alternative plans are identical to 
the ones the regulator imposes in the case of partial flexibility. 
6 Throughout the paper it is implicitly assumed the regulator has no instruments other than tariffs and the 
regulatory scheme. This is a reasonable assumption for many countries, especially for the type of universal 
access problem addressed: the access of low income customers. In particular, the efficiency result for the case of full flexibility corresponds to Vogelsang's 
(1989) result, once the initial set of prices is chosen to satisfy the universal access 
constraint and to leave no rent to the monopolist (after he optimally designs his alternative 
plans). The paper’s contribution is three-fold: it analyzes alternative regulatory schemes in 
which the monopolist is granted different degrees of flexibility and it ranks them 
unambiguously; it identifies the optimally regulated tariffs and how they must change if the 
regulatory regime changes; and finally, it shows that in the particular setup in which 
consumers' preferences satisfy the single crossing property, there is no welfare loss if the 
regulator focuses on a single regulated tariff.
7 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the model and 
solves the regulator's problem assuming that there is no universal service constraint (this 
being a useful benchmark to contrast our results). In Section 3, the regulator's optimal tariff 
problem under the three regulatory schemes is derived and the main results presented. In 
Section 4 final remarks are presented. All formal proofs are found in the Appendix. 
 




The cost function for the firm is assumed 
 
Cs,m  A  hs  gm,  
 
where  A is a fixed cost, independent of the number of customers and the number of 
minutes, h(s) is an avoidable fixed cost that depends on the number of subscribers s but not 
on total output m (from now on we will refer to this output as the number of minutes), and 
g is the constant marginal cost.
8 
 
The firm's only income comes from the two-part tariff received from consumers. It is 




There are 2 types of consumers that differ in their valuation of the service. Those of high 
valuation -h- (low valuation -l-) derive a utility uh (ul) from being connected, and vh(m) 
(vl(m)) from consuming m minutes. Type h consumers are a fraction α of the total 
population which is normalized to one. 
 
                                                 
7 Given the particular asymmetric information assumption, in this setup the monopolist obtains no rent. If 
some asymmetry about costs (or total demand) were included, the low cost (high demand) monopolist would 
certainly obtain an informational rent, and the regulator should optimally define a menu of two-part tariffs 
rather than a single one. 
8 The simplicity of the cost function makes it easier to derive all results. In fact, nothing essential would 
change with a more general cost function as long as it had some fixed costs and the marginal cost is larger 
than consumers' marginal valuation for a sufficiently large m. If a type i = h, l customer pays a fixed charge t, a per-minute price p, and consume mi 
minutes, his total utility is ui +vi(mi) – t – pmi. 
 
The assumptions on the functions  vi  are standard: they are differentiable, increasing, 
strictly concave, and  ) ( ) ( m v m v l h
′ ′ >   holds for any  0 > m . Further, it is assumed that 




∞ → h h m l l m m v m v  and uh is large enough. 
 











SB ≡ ml : vl
′ml − vh
′ ml  1 − g.  
 
∗
l m  and 
∗
h m  are first-best quantities (recall g is firm's marginal cost) and 
SB
l m  is the quantity 
a second-degree price discriminating monopolist would choose for low valuation 
consumers ( 0 >
SB




The regulator maximizes the weighted sum of utilities of all consumers. In doing so, he will 
choose a unique regulated tariff (t, p).
9 Formally, his problem is given by 
 
t,p
max uh  vhmh − t − pmh  1 − ul  vlml − t − pml
 
 
subject to the firm's self-financing constraint and consumer's optimal behavior, which are 
expressed as  
 








A participation constraint for consumers type l will be included later. 
 
To help in the interpretation of the model and its results, it is useful to “translate” a two-part 
tariff –a point (t, p)– to a pair of points in the plane (m, T). Given (t, p),   ( ) h h l l T m T m , ; ,  is 
such that  ( ),
1
p v m l l
− ′ = , p m t T l l + = ( ),
1
p v m h h
− ′ = and  ; p m t T h h + =   that is to say, the 
                                                 
9 As will become clear, the regulator choosing a unique two-part tariff rather than a menu is without loss of 
generality. quantities are the ones consumers would choose given p, and total payments Tl and Th are 
equal to that which consumers would pay facing a two-part tariff (t, p).  
 
Note that by defining a pair (ml, Tl) the pair (ml, Tl) is uniquely determined by the following 
equations: 
 
mh  mml ≡ m : vl
′ml  vh
′ m




The regulator's problem can therefore be written as  
 
() ( ) ( ) ) OF (                 ], ) ( [ 1 ] , ) ( [ R } , { l l l l l l l h h T m T m v u m T T m m v u Max
l l
− + − + − + α α  
 
subject to  
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (R1)                     0 1 ) 1 ( 1 , ≥ − + − − − − + l l l l l m m m g h A T m T T α α α α  
 
When participation of l-types is not an issue, the solution to the above problem is trivial:  
,
∗ = l l m m and  () g m h A T l l
∗ + + = 1 ( w h i c h  i m p l y   
∗ = h h m m  and  () g m h A T h h
∗ + + = 1 ) ;  o r ,  i n  
terms of the two-part tariff,  () ( ) ( ). , 1 , g h A p t + =  
 
3.  Results 
 
In this section, the options the regulator has when he faces a binding universal service 
obligation are analyzed.
10 This constraint is simply incorporated as a participation 
constraint for the low valuation customers, given by 
 
(R2)                                                            , ) ( U T m v u l l l l ≥ − +  
 
where  U is their reservation utility. To assume this constraint is binding amounts to 
assuming that the solution to the previous problem (OFR subject to R1) does not satisfy this 
expression when participation is not an issue. That is, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) (S1)                                                  1 U h A gm m v u l l l l < + − − +
∗ ∗  
 
For the rest of the paper, (S1) is assumed to hold. This inequality by no means implies that, 
from a social point of view, it would be optimal to exclude low valuation customers. As 
long as their utility minus the marginal cost of connecting them exceeds their reservation 
utility it will be optimal to have them subscribing to the service. That is whenever  
 
                                                 
10 The universal service is actually an obligation on the firm, but the regulator has to make sure the firm can 









11 For the results of the paper is irrelevant whether the above inequality holds, as it’s 
assumed that the regulator seeks to maximize the consumers' surplus constrained by (R2). 
Therefore, in this setup, the cost per subscriber h(s) plays a role identical to the fixed cost 
A. 
 
A Single Two-part Tariff and no Flexibility 
 
Under the no flexibility regime, the regulator's problem is to find a two-part tariff such that 
the monopolist breaks even and the universal service goal is fulfilled. By assumption (S1), 
the first-best solution discussed above will not suffice. The regulator must find a way to 
subsidize low valuation customers, and this can be done simply by raising the per-minute 
price and lowering the fixed charge. This will result in an indirect subsidy from type h to 
type l customers. Proposition 1 formalizes this result, which rationalizes what has been part 
of an implicit universal service policy in some countries (e.g., Chile prior to the 
introduction of a partial flexibility scheme in 2004, and Colombia since the implementation 
of the new tariff framework in 2005). 
 
Proposition 1: Let ( ) l l T m ,  be the solution to (OFR) subject to (R1) and (R2) under (S1). 
Then () l l T m , is such that (R1) and (R2) are satisfied as equalities and  l m  is strictly lower 





The formal proof is given in the Appendix. Figure 1 illustrates the result. This depicts the 
case where  ( ) ( ) () . 1 U h A gm m v u l l l l < + − − +
∗ ∗  The regulator must therefore lower t and raise 
p up to the point where the equations  ( )( ) 1 1 h A Z Z l h + = − + α α  and   
() ( ) () ( ) U T m v u p pv t p v v u l l l l l l l l = − + = − − +
− − ′ ′
1 1
 are satisfied. 
 




Two different flexibility schemes will be analyzed. Under the first one, called “partial 
flexibility”, the monopolist is allowed to offer alternative plans to customers. However, all 
alternative plans, on top of the one designed by the regulator, must be available to all 
customers. In the second one, which named “full flexibility”, this constraint is removed and 
the monopolist is allowed to design an alternative plan for each customer (but he must also 
                                                 
11 This setup does not consider network externalitites that would add to the convenience of having low 
valuation customers connected. 
12 Note that a solution to this problem may not exist. Given the cost parameters, it could be the case that for 
any price above the marginal cost the quantity consumed by type h customers decreases so quickly that it is 
insufficient to compensate for the deficit the monopolist has with type l customers. By now it is assumed that 
this is not the case; later it will be characterized precisely when there is no solution. offer the regulated plan to all consumers). For both schemes the timing of the game will be 
the same: the regulator defines a regulated tariff, the monopolist then designs the alternative 




To solve the game by backward induction it is necessary to obtain first the firm's reaction 
function given a regulated plan. Since consumers are of only two types, it is possible with 
no loss of generality, to constrain the firm to choose just two alternative plans. 
 
Proposition 2 below characterizes this reaction function,
13 but first it is necessary to define 
the following two functions: 
 




l l , ,
′   is a T such that low valuation individuals are indifferent 




l m T ,   and   () ( ); ,m Tl ⋅










Definition 2:   ( )
R
l m m ~   is an m such that type h consumers are indifferent between choosing 






















 vhm − vlm.
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates these definitions. 
 
                                                 
13 The firm's reaction function can be stated in alternative ways: 
1) As a mapping from 
2
+ ℜ  -the pair ( )
R R t p , - to 
4
+ ℜ  -the pair of two-part tariffs the firm will offer  
() ( ) () , , , , h h l l t p t p which in turn can be viewed as a pair ( ) ( ) h h l l T m T m , , ,  once the consumers' reaction is 
considered; 
2) As a mapping from a subset of 
4








l T m T m , , ,  that result from the pair   
( )
R R t p ,  when consumers' reaction is considered- to a subset of 
4
+ ℜ  -alternative tariff plans   
() ( ) () h h l l T m T m , , ,   that satisfy all incentive compatibility constraints; or 




l T m ,  to the alternative tariff plans  ( ) ( ) ( ). , , , h h l l T m T m This interpretation is a 








l T m ,  is set by the functions  () l m m and  
() l l m T T , . These definitions guarantee the alternative plans  ( ) ( ) ( ) h h l l T m T m , , , satisfy the incentive 
compatibility constraints. 
The third option is followed as it can be easily represented in the plane (m, T). FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 












The problem the monopolist solves is 
 
{} ( ) ( )( ) ) (OF                                  1 M , , , l l h h T T m m gm T gm T Max
h l h l
− − + − α α  
 
subject to  
 
() ( )
() () () () ()
() () ) (IC                                                                         
) (IC                       ,
) (IC                                                                       


















l l l l l
T m v T m v
m T T m m v T m v T m v
T m v T m v
− ≥ −




The first and second constraints guarantee that the alternative plans offered by the 
monopolist are actually preferred by all customers to the regulated plan. The third 
constraint is the standard incentive compatibility constraint, which ensures type h 
individuals actually prefer the alternative plan intended for them to the one designed for l-




l T m ,  is such that the l-types 
participation constraint is satisfied and can therefore be omitted.
14 
 








l l l ≥ − +   




l m m ≥   then the menu of alternative plans the monopolist will propose is:  
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
R






l l l l
R
l l m m v m v m T T m m v m v T m − + − +
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ , , , ,  























l m m ≤   then the menu of alternative plans the monopolist will propose is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) {
()( )( )() () } . ,
, ,
SB















m v m v m v m v T m
m v m v T m
− + − +
− +
∗ ∗  
 
                                                 
14 It is argued below (see footnote 19) that this is with no loss of generality, given that the ultimate goal is to 
solve the regulator's problem subject to this participation constraint. 
 
 Figure 3 illustrates the result of this proposition for three different regulated plans (one for 
each relevant segment of  ml
R  ). The regulated plans are depicted as black figures, while the 
corresponding white figures represent the firm's reaction to the regulated plans (i.e., the 
alternative plans it would offer). 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 













































so the firm's reaction function is  mml
R,Tl
R  vl mml
R − vlml






R .   
 




l T m ,   that maximizes his 
objective function taking into account the self-financing and participation constraints and 
how the monopolist will react by offering alternative plans. 
 


















                 (OF’R) 
 











A − h1 − gmh
∗  1 − mlml
R ≥ 0








l l l ≥ − +            ( R 2 ’ )  
 
Note that the participation constraint for l-types (R2’) is written in terms of the regulated 
plan rather than the alternative plan the monopolist will design. This is valid in this case 
because, as Proposition 2 shows, the utility that l-type consumers will get with the 
alternative plan is always the same they obtain with the regulated plan. 
 
Proposition 3 below presents a formal solution to this problem, but first the results are 
illustrated by making use of Figure 3. The analysis starts at the regulated plan   
( ) ( ), , U m v g l l −
∗   which translates to points a, a’ for type l and h respectively. In this plan, 
the per-minute price equals the marginal cost and the fixed charge t is such that low 
valuation consumers get their reservation utility   . U   Then, since the plan involves efficient 
quantities, the monopolist can not gain by designing alternative plans. The assumption (S1) 
implies, however, that this plan does not satisfy the self-financing constraint. 
 
What are the options open to the regulator? As he changes the regulated plan to the left 




l m m ≥  ), the regulated plan becomes less and less attractive to consumers of type-h and, 
as a consequence, the alternative plan the monopolist designs for them will increase the 
money transfer   h T   (and his benefits) while maintaining the efficient quantity  
∗
h m  . This is 




l m m ≥   because the monopolist will offer  
∗
l m   
for the l-types. So the first best will be attainable if and only if the monopolist profits 




l m m =   are non-negative. 
 




l m m =  the first best will be 
unattainable. To increase monopolist's profits further, the regulator keeps reducing 
R
l m   
along the indifference curve  U   (e.g., the plan represented by the black square), but now 
there will be no menu of alternative plans that involves efficient quantities for both types 
and also satisfies the self-financing and incentive compatibility constraints at the same 
time. The profit maximizing monopolist will now choose to distort down the quantity  l m   
in order to satisfy ( )
R
h IC  as an equality. 
 








l m m <  (e.g., the plan represented by the black triangle), then choosing   
() ( )() ( ))
R




l h m m v m v m T T T − + =
∗ ,  and satisfying ( )
R
h IC  would imply choosing   
,
SB
l l m m <  which is never optimal for the monopolist (note that the menu of alternative 
plans the monopolist chooses does not depend on  
R








l m m = then the problem has no solution: the 
self-financing constraint and the participation constraint can not be satisfied simultaneously 
by any incentive compatible plan.
15 
 
Logically, the monopolist being able to be self-financing depends on the proportion of 
consumers of each type. Intuitively, if α is close to one, the extra profit the monopolist will 
need to make out of consumers of type h will be relatively small, and therefore,  
R
l m  could 
be close to  .
∗
l m  As α decreases, this extra profit must increase, which amounts to a decrease 
in 
R
l m , but never going beyond 
L
l m . Two critical values of α can be defined. 
FB α  is such 
that if  
FB α α ≥  the first best will be attainable: 
 
()( ) ( ) ( )
() () () () () }; 1
1 : 1 , 0 {
h A gm m v m v U m v u
gm U m v u
h l h h h l l l
l l l l
FB
+ = − − + − +
+ − − + − ∈ ≡







SB α  is such that 
SB α α <  implies that the self-financing constraint and the participation 
constraint for  l-types can not be satisfied together: 
 
()( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () () () () () }. 1
1 : 1 , 0 {
h A gm m v m v U m v u
gm U m v u
h
SB








+ = − − + − +
+ − − + − ∈ ≡
∗ ∗ α α α
α α α α α
 
 
Note that the definition of  
SB α  recognizes the fact that 
SB
l m  depends on α. It is now 
possible to formally state the solution to the regulator's problem. 
 
Proposition 3:  Consider the maximization of OF' subject to (R1’) and (R2’): 
a) If  
FB α α ≥   the first best is achievable. An optimal regulated plan is  ( ,
R
l m   
( ) ), U m v u
R















∗  A  h1.
 
b) If   [ ), ,




l − + where  






l m m m , ∈   and satisfies  











∗  A  h1.
 
c) If   ,
SB α α <   there is no regulated plan such that (R1’) and (R2’) are satisfied. 
 
                                                 
15 Of course, if this is the case in this model with partial flexibility it must also be the case in the no flexibility 
case. 
 
 The formal proof is relegated to the Appendix. 
 
Note that when 
FB α α >  there are many solutions, as the regulator can, at no social cost, 
give type-l individuals some rent. This is not possible for values of  ,
FB α α ≤ since the extra 





The case where the monopolist is not obliged to offer all alternative plans to all consumers 
is now analyzed (but he must have the regulated plan readily available). As the incentive 
compatibility constraints between alternative plans become irrelevant (in particular h IC ), 
this case is analytically much simpler than the previous one. The monopolist will design -
for each type- a plan with an efficient quantity and a payment such that the consumer is 





l T m ,   that satisfies the l-type participation constraint will induce a menu of alternative 
plans. 
 
( ) ( ) () {
() ( )() () () } . , ,
, ,
R






l l l l
R
l l
m m v m v m T T m







The problem for the regulator is simply to find the point on the type-l indifference curve  
U   such that the monopolist, after designing the menu of alternative plans, obtains zero 
profits. As in the partial flexibility case, the firm's profits increase as 
R
l m  decreases from 
ml
∗.  In fact, the two profit functions are the same as long as  .
∗ ≥ l
R
l m m  But, unlike the 




l m m <  does not imply any distortion of the quantities -() h IC  is 
irrelevant- and therefore, as 
R
l m  decreases profits will increase faster in the case of full 
flexibility. Moreover, profits still increase as  
R




l m m <   
Proposition 4 formalizes this result. 
 




l T m ,  that 




l l l ≥ − +   the monopolist will offer the menu of alternative plans  
                                                 
16 It was claimed above that restricting the regulated plans to satisfy the l-type participation constraint was 
with no loss of generality. The argument is the following: If the regulated plan does not satisfy it, the 
monopolist, maximizing its profits, will either choose a menu of alternative plans such that the component 
designed for l-types satisfies the participation constraint or it will simply focus on h-types. As the regulator 
would never choose a regulated plan such that the l-types are excluded, we can therefore focus on the first 
case. Now, if the monopolist designs a menu of alternative plans such that  l-types participate, the menu will 
have the following characteristics: a) mh  mh
∗,  b) Th  w i l l  b e  s u c h  t h a t  ICh  i s  b i n d i n g ,  c )  
ml ∈ ml
SB,ml
∗,  and d)  Tl  u  vlml − U.  But any such plan could be induced with a regulated 
plan Tl
R,ml
R, where  ml
R ∈ ml
L,ml
H  and  Tl
R
  is such that the  l-types participation constraint is 
satisfied as an equality. ( ) ( ) () {
() ( )() () () } . , ,
, ,
R






l l l l
R
l l
m m v m v m T T m











l −   where  
R
l m   satisfies 
 vlml






∗ − vh mlml
R − gmh
∗  1 − vlml
∗ − U − gml
∗  A  h1.
 
 
The formal proof is relegated to the Appendix. 
 
This result is the same as that of Vogelsang (1989) for the particular case of a single initial 
two-part tariff. Interestingly, in this paper’s setup, a single regulated two-part tariff is 
sufficient to induce an efficient outcome.
17 
 
From this proposition and the previous one it is possible to conclude that there will be some 
parameter configurations for which the monopolist is unable to provide a service to both 
types under the scheme of partial flexibility, but he will be able to do it under total 
flexibility. 
 
Maintaining the assumption that (S1) holds, the results can be summarized in terms of the 
parameter α: when 
FB α α ≥  the first best is attainable with both partial and full flexibility, 
but not under the no flexibility scheme; if  [ )
FB SB α α α , ∈  the first-best can be attained only 
with full flexibility, with partial flexibility being strictly better than no flexibility; and if 
SB α α <  the universal access and self-financing constraints can not be fulfilled together 
with partial or no flexibility, whith the full flexibility scheme still providing first best 
results. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
The paper shows the convenience of allowing a regulated monopolist to price discriminate 
when the regulator has a binding universal access constraint. Two different flexibility 
schemes are analyzed, both sharing the features that the monopolist is obliged to offer a 
plan that the regulator has designed for all customers, but he is also allowed to offer 
alternative plans to his customers. Under the first scheme -partial flexibility- any alternative 
plan must be readily available to all customers, while in the second -full flexibility- this 
constraint disappears. 
 
It is demonstrated that total flexibility is (weakly) superior to partial flexibility.
18 The 
intuition for this result has to do with the superior information the monopolist has and his 
                                                 
17 Vogelsang (1989), and most of the literature cited in the Introduction, does not focus on the optimality of 
the initial prices but on the firm's reaction to those initial prices. 
18 They are equally good only when the universal access constraint is not too strong and the first best is 
attainable under the two schemes. ability to use it. Under complete flexibility the monopolist can always exploit the superior 
information to induce efficient quantities, whereas under partial flexibility he is constrained 
in the same way as a second-degree price discriminating monopolist would be.
19 
 
Optimally regulated tariffs are derived for each regime and it is fully characterized when 
the first best is attainable. As the regulatory scheme changes from the most inflexible one –
in which the regulator defines a unique tariff– to the more flexible ones –in which the firm 
can offer alternative plans– the fixed charge of the regulated two-part tariff must decrease 
while the per-unit price must increase. Such changes were observed, for example, in 
Colombia since 2005 with the implementation of the new regulatory scheme, and in Chile 
in 2004 when the main telecom firm was granted the right to offer alternative plans in 
addition to the regulated one.
20 
 
Although Pareto inferior, the scheme of partial flexibility could be relevant for reasons of 
political economy as it might be quite difficult for a regulator to explain how it is possible 
that the regulated firm can offer some plans to certain consumers but not to all of them. In 
fact, to the best of our knowledge, all the countries that allow their operators to offer 
alternative plans do it in the spirit of what we called partial flexibility rather than full 
flexibility. 
                                                 
19 The constraint arises not because of any information asymmetry between consumers and the monopolist -as 
in the canonical case of screening-, but because the regulator imposes that all plans must be available to all 
customers. 
20 We do not claim that regulators have allowed firms to offer alternative plans because they have followed a 
similar line of reasoning in ours. Their decisions probably had to do more with incipient competition in the 
telephony market and/or the monopolist's need of offering bundled services (e.g., triple play).  
A.  Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Let    and    be the multipliers for (R1) and (R2) respectively. 
Since we assumed the solution to (OF) restricted only by (R1) does not satisfy (R2), it 
follows that    0.   
Differentiating with respect to Tl,  we get 
  1    0.  
 
Therefore, the two constraints are binding in the solution. 
 
For the sake of contradiction assume  ml ≥ ml
∗.  Note that (R1) can be written as  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ' (R1'                             , 1 l l l l l l m m m g m v gm h A T − − − + + =
′ α  
and replacing in (R2) we get 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ' (R2'                     . 1 ) ( U m m m g m v h A gm m v u l l l l l l l l = − − + − − − +
′ α  
 
Since  vlml − gml ≤ vlml
∗ − gml
∗  and vl
′ml − gmml − ml ≤ 0, the above 
equality contradicts (S1).  Therefore, ml  ml
∗. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: The monopolist's problem is 
 
{} [ ] ( )[ ] l l h h
T T m m gm T gm T Max
h l h l
− − + − α α 1
, , ,  
subject to 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
() ()
() ()
() () )   -   (IC                                                                 
)   -   (IC                                                                 
)   -   (IC                                                               
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As standard in this type of problem, the constraint (ICl) does not bind and can therefore be 
ignored. The first order conditions for this problem are: 
 
Th :  −  −   0
mh : −g  vh
′ mh  vh
′ mh  0
Tl : 1 −  −     0
ml : −1 − g  vl
′ml − vh







To these conditions we must add the non-negativity of the multipliers, the constraints 
themselves, and the fact that if a multiplier is strictly positive then its associated inequality constraint must be satisfied as an equality. 
 
From (1) and (2) it is clear that mh  mh
∗.  Note also that (3) implies   0.   
 
a) Consider the case  ml
R ≥ ml
H.  
Assume   0.  Then (3) and (4) imply  ml  ml
∗.  Using ICl
R and ICh as equalities,  
ICh
R can be rewritten as 
 














This contradicts that ml  ml
∗ (the last weak inequality follows from the definition of   
ml
H,  the assumption that ml
R ≥ ml
H  and that vh
′ m  vl
′m for any m). Therefore,   
  0.  
 
Conditions (3) and (4) imply that ml  ml
∗.  Moreover,     0 and   1 −   0.   
Therefore ICh
R and ICl


















b) Consider the case ml
R ∈ ml
L,ml
H.   
Following the steps in a), it is clear that if   0 then ml  ml
∗,  and given that ml
R  ml
H, 
constraint  ICh  can not be satisfied. Therefore    0.  
 
Assume   0.  Then    and   1.  By (4) ml  ml
SB,  and using ICh













Substituting Tl from ICl































Therefore    0.   Using  ICh
R,    ICl
R,   and  ICh  as equalities the desired result is 
obtained. 
 
c) Consider the case  ml
R ≤ ml
L.   
Assume constraint ICh
R is not binding. Then    and   1.  (4) implies that 
ml  ml
SB,  and from ICl














Note that the proposed solution satisfies ICh
















The inequality holds since  ml
R ≤ ml
L  implies  mml
R ≤ ml
SB.   
 





















R  1 −  Tl
R  vl mlml
R − vlml
R −
A − h1 − gmh
∗  1 − mlml
R ≥ 0 
       (R1’ - φ ) 




l l l ≥ − +  
 





R  1,  so from the first order condition 
(differentiating with respect to Tl
R ) it follows that     1  0.  Therefore, the self-
financing constraint must hold as an equality in the solution.  
a) For  ≥ FB,  the proof proceeds in two steps. First it shows that the first best can be 
induced by ml
R  ml
H  for the extreme case that   FB.  Second, it shows that the firm's 
profit function is strictly decreasing in ml
R  (for ml
R ≥ ml
H ) as the regulated plan moves 
along the l-type indifference curve U (i.e., assuming Tl
R  ul  vlml
R − U). Since the 
profit function is continuous, using the Intermediate Value Theorem it can then be 
concluded that for every  ≥ FB,  there is a unique ml
R ≥ ml
H such that the monopolist 
makes zero profits. This is so, because the monopolist would get strictly positive profits if 




R − U (note that, given the regulated plan, 
the profit function for the monopolist is strictly increasing in α and equal to zero if 









H.  By proposition 2, the monopolist will offer efficient quantities, so 
it suffices to show he gets no rent. 
 





∗  1 − FBvlml
∗ − gml
∗ −















∗  1 − FBvlml
∗ − gml
∗  ul − U − A − h1,  
 













which follows immediately from the definition of ml
H  and  m.  
 
2) The firm's profit function for values of ml
R ≥ ml
H , taking into account Proposition 2, and 
choosing Tl
R  ul  vlml













∗  ul − U − A − h1  
 
Differentiating with respect to ml




R,  by definition of mml









b) For SB,FB,  the proof proceeds in five steps: first it is shown that   0,  so the two 
constraints are satisfied as equalities to determine the solution (i.e., it must be the case that 
Tl
R  ul  vlml
R − U and the monopolist gets no rent). Second, it is shown that if 
  SB and ml
R  ml
LSB (recall that ml
L is related to ml
SB,  which depends on α. 
Therefore, ml
L  also depends on α), the self-financing constraint is satisfied as an equality, 
so  ml
L is the solution if   SB.  Third, it is shown that profits are positive if 
 ∈ SB,FB and ml
R  ml
L.  Fourth, it is shown that for any  ∈ SB,FB,  if 
ml
R  ml
H  then profits are strictly negative. By the intermediate value theorem, for every 
 ∈ SB,FB there will be an ml
R ∈ ml
L,ml
H such that profits are zero. To conclude, it 
is shown that the profit function is monotonous on ml
R,  so for every α the particular ml
R  
that makes profits equal to zero is unique. 
 
1) From the first order condition (differentiating with respect to  Tl
R  ) it follows   
    1.    



















From the first order condition (when we differentiate with respect to  ml

















R  1 −  vl
′ mml
R  − vl
′ml
R − 1 − g  0
 
 







R    11 −  vl
′ mml
R − g  0.
 
 
The second term of the left hand side is strictly positive: from part a) of the proof it is clear 
that, given Tl
R  ul  vlml
R − U,  then if ml
R ≥ ml
H and   FB  the monopolist makes strictly negative profits, therefore ml
R  ml
H is required, and by Proposition 2,   
mml
R  ml











R  0 ). 
 
2) The firm's profit function for ml
R  ml
LSB,   SB,  taking into account Proposition 
2 and choosing Tl
R  ul  vlml




















L ul − U − A − h1.
 
 
By definition,  mml
L  ml













SB  ul − U − A − h1.
 
 













and, by the definition of  ml
L,    mml
L  ml
SB
 . Therefore, the previous expression can be 









SB  ul − U − A − h1;
 
 
which, by the definition of  SB,   is equal to zero. 
 
3) Consider the profit function for the monopolist (which is a function of   as 
R
l m  is set 
equal to  () α
L









SB ul − U − A − h1.
 
The above expression is zero when   SB.  Differentiating this function with respect to α, and considering that by the definition of ml
SB
 it holds that 
vl
′ml − vh













4) Note first that mml
H  ml
∗
 does not depend on α. Then, for an  ∈ SB,FB and 




R  ul  vlml













H ul − U − A − h1.
 
 
By definition of m and considering mml
H  ml
∗






∗  1 − vlml
∗ − gml
∗ 
ul − U − A − h1.  
 
Given the definition of FB  and since we are considering   FB  the above expression is 
strictly negative. 
 
5) For a given  ∈ SB,FB the profit function for the monopolist, considering 
Proposition 2 and Tl
R  ul  vlml













R ul − U − A − h1.
 
 






R− 1 − gmml
R 
ul − U − A − h1  
 
If we differentiate with respect to  ml










The first factor is strictly negative for any ml
R  ml
L,  as mml
R  ml
SB.  The second 


















is strictly positive, so the profit function is strictly monotone in ml





c) Note that, given Proposition 2, if ml
R  ml
L,  the alternative plans offered by the 
monopolist are the same as if ml
R  ml
L.  Therefore, following step b.2) above, profits for 






∗  1 − vlml
SB − gml
SB 
ul − U − A − h1.  
 
It was shown that profits are zero if  :
FB α α =  the firm is making losses with type l 
customers that are just compensated by profits with h-types. Therefore, profits are strictly 
negative if   FB . 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: Since the monopolist can offer a different plan to each individual, 
his problem can be presented as two separate problems, one for each type of consumer.  
 





         subject to 
 




i i i i i = − ≥ −  
 
Note that the constraint must bind (otherwise we could raise Ti and increase the benefits). 
Substituting Ti  in the objective function and differentiating with respect to mi it is obtained 
that  vi
′mi − g  0,  which implies  .
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Figure 3: Firm￿ s optimal alternative plans under partial ￿ exibility
27
Figure 3